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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
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REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (11 Apr 69) FOR OT UT 691184

17 April 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 5th Battalion,
2d Artillery, Period Ending 31 January 1969 (U)

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

**C. A. STANFIELD
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General**

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5th Battalion, 2d Artillery

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 5th Battalion (AW)(SP) 2d Artillery
APO San Francisco 96266

AW-53

9 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Battalion (AW)(SP) 2d Artillery for
the Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

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1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities

a. Administration/Personnel:

(1) During this reporting period personnel replacements have been received in sufficient numbers to adequately fulfill operational requirements. During the period November - December 1968, critical shortages developed in the MOS 16P (Light ADA Crewman) and in MOS 17E (Artillery Searchlight Crewman) which required the battalion's widely dispersed tactical elements to support combat requirements with understrength manning crews. Additionally, replacement personnel received during that period generally possessed a wide variety of non-automatic weapons related MOS's which required a considerable OJT period to develop the required AW skills and job proficiency. However, since mid January 1969, the personnel replacement problem has been improving and replacements are now being received in sufficient number and MOS to relieve critical shortages.

(2) The following awards were presented to assigned and attached personnel:

AWARDS

NUMBER

Silver Star	4
Bronze Star "V"	4
Bronze Star	26
Air Medal	5
Army Commendation Medal	45
Army Commendation Medal "V"	7
Purple Heart	14
Good Conduct Medal	37

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(3) The battalion headquarters was engaged in normal operations during the reporting period with increased effort directed toward redesigning and strengthening the perimeter defense of the headquarters compound.

FOR OT UT
691184

Inclosure 1

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(4) During the period 26 November - 20 January 1969, the Vulcan Combat Team (VCT) was attached to Battery A, 5th Battalion (AW)(SP) 2d Artillery, to support AW missions in the 1st Infantry Division's TAOR. Upon completion of the evaluation objectives in the 1st Infantry Division's TAOR, the VCT was attached to Battery B, 5th Battalion (AW)(SP) 2d Artillery, where it is currently conducting AW operations in support of the 25th Division.

(5) There were no administrative or tactical movements of Headquarters, 5th Battalion (AW)(SP) 2d Artillery, during this reporting period.

(6) Battalion personnel statistics as of 31 January 1969:

(a) Current Strength:

	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>			<u>ASSIGNED</u>		
	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM
5th Bn (AW)(SP) 2d Arty	37	3	652	40	3	609
D Btry (MG) 71st Arty	2	0	140	3	0	119
I Btry (SLT) 29th Arty	7	0	143	5	0	124
VCT (Provisional)	1	0	23	1	0	22
	<u>47</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>958</u>	<u>49</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>874</u>

(b) Gains and losses: 1 Nov 68 - 31 Jan 69

	<u>GAINS</u>	<u>LOSSES</u>
5th Bn (AW)(SP) 2d Arty	272	200
D Btry (MG) 71st Arty	41	16
I Btry (SLT) 29th Arty	40	41
VCT (Provisional)	0	1
	<u>353</u>	<u>267</u>

(c) Casualties 1 Nov 68 - 31 Jan 69:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
Died of Battle Wounds	0
KIA	0
WIA	28
MIA	0
Non-Battle Deaths	0
	<u>28</u>

(d) R & R Experience:

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>
Australia	22	12	15
Bangkok	5	14	3
Hawaii	14	10	16
Hong Kong	3	2	5
Manila	1	1	1

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<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>
Penang	2	3	1
Singapore	1	2	0
Taipei	1	1	2
Tokyo	2	0	3
Kuala Lumpur	1	0	0
In-Country	<u>5</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>0</u>
	57	53	46

(7) Current organizational structure of the 5th Battalion (AW)(SP) 2d Artillery is at Inclosure 1.

b. Operations:

(1) General: This reporting period was characterized by the repositioning of automatic weapons and searchlight assets consistent with the changing operational situation and the increasing exploitation of the M42A1 indirect fire capabilities. The battalion's overall combat capability was appreciably enhanced by the attachment and subsequent deployment of the Vulcan Combat Team (VCT); however, the battalion's flexibility and maintenance support has been limited by the almost total commitment of General Support assets in response to demands for automatic weapons in the Saigon and Bien Hoa Area. Continuing emphasis was placed on developing procedures and doctrine directed at improving the indirect fire accuracy of the M42A1.

(2) Unit Attachments and Missions:

(a) During this reporting period, the battalion remained assigned to US Army Vietnam and attached to II Field Force with operational control of the Battalion's assets exercised by II Field Force Artillery.

(b) Batteries A, B, and C remained in attachment for OPCON and logistics to the 1st, 25th, and 9th Infantry Divisions respectively.

(c) Battery D remained in General Support of II Field Force Vietnam Artillery, with elements further attached for OPCON and logistics as follows: two sections (4 M42A1's) attached to the 199th Light Infantry Brigade; two sections (4 M42A1's) attached to the 54th Artillery Group and further attached to the 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery; one section (2 M42A1's) attached to the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force; one section (2 M42A1's) attached to the Bien Hoa Tactical Area Command; and two sections (4 M42A1's) supporting missions for II Field Force Vietnam Artillery.

(d) Battery D (MG) 71st Artillery remained in General Support of II Field Force and attached to the 5th Bn (AW)(SP) 2d Arty with firing elements further attached for OPCON and logistical support as follows: two sections (8 M55's) attached to the 23rd Artillery Group; one section each attached to the 54th Artillery Group and the 25th Infantry Division; one-half section each (2 M55's) attached to the 199th Light Infantry Brigade

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and the 9th Infantry Division; one-half section remained in Direct Support of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam and one-half section in battery maintenance with on order missions. Headquarters, Battery D (MG) 71st Artillery remains co-located with Headquarters, 5th Battalion (AW)(SP) 2d Artillery.

(e) Battery I (Searchlight) 29th Artillery remained attached to the 5th Battalion (AW)(SP) 2d Artillery and further attached for OPCON and logistics as follows: First and Third Platoon attached to 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions respectively; the Second Platoon remained in General Support of II Field Force with elements OPCON to the 199th Light Infantry Brigade, 54th Artillery Group, 23rd Artillery Group, 1st Transportation Battalion, and the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force. Headquarters, 5th Battalion (AW)(SP) 2d Artillery.

(f) During this reporting period the Vulcan Combat Team has been attached to A, B, and D Batteries, 5th Battalion (AW)(SP) 2d Artillery, to support missions normally assigned to M42A1's and M55's in order to accomplish a realistic comparative evaluation of the Vulcan System in the ground support role and develop employment doctrine.

(g) Current deployments and individual unit missions of the 5th Battalion (AW)(SP) 2d Artillery are listed at Inclosure 2.

(3) Automatic Weapon and Searchlight deployments are portrayed graphically at Inclosure 3.

(4) Combat Readiness Evaluation Program (CRE): The Operational Readiness Evaluation Program, developed on 1 November 1968 was expanded upon by the Combat Readiness Evaluation Program developed on 20 December 1968. The battalion developed a Combat Readiness Evaluation Program designed to provide a more detailed and a more realistic evaluation of the mission capabilities of firing units in the field and also to serve as an instructional medium to standardize procedures and improve overall tactical and technical proficiency. To support the objectives of this program, a battalion CRE team was organized consisting of experienced officers and NCO's from the Operations, Communications, and Maintenance sections of the battalion headquarters. The CRE is comprehensive in nature and provides a detailed evaluation of crew drill, direct and indirect fire procedures, job knowledge, communications procedures, artillery and automotive maintenance, field sanitation and small arms. The results of the CRE's conducted to date indicate that the program is producing the desired results and has already brought about a marked improvement in the overall proficiency of the battalion's firing elements. A copy of the CRE regulation and evaluation sheets is at Inclosure 4.

(5) Significant Combat Operations:

(a) 17 December 1968, Dau Tieng ambush — On 17 December 1968, two (2) M42 Dusters from B Battery, 5th Battalion (AW)(SP) 2d Artillery were escorting the second march unit in a convoy traveling from Chu Chi to Dau Tieng. At 1045H a battalion size enemy force ambushed the second march

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unit from positions on both sides of the road. Using automatic weapons and RPG fire the enemy stopped the march unit by disabling two large trucks loaded with ammunition. Once the march unit was halted, a large enemy force emerged from the treeline along the north side of the road and began delivering well coordinated mortar, RPG, and automatic weapons fire. The two (2) M42's immediately engaged the enemy force advancing on the convoy from the north side of the road. Meanwhile, two (2) additional M42's, which had been dispatched from Dau Tieng earlier in the day to a road outpost, were radioed for assistance. By the time they arrived, a small enemy force along the south side had been neutralized, but the larger enemy force on the north side of the road was still advancing and was attempting to overrun two disabled APC's. During the next few minutes the battle waxed to its greatest intensity, but the tremendous volume of firepower delivered by the four (4) M42's in conjunction with air strikes and well aimed artillery, forced the enemy to withdraw after sustaining heavy casualties. The aftermath of the battle revealed that the American Forces had sustained 6 KIA, 13 WIA, with 4 APC's, eight 5 tons, one 2½ ton, and one ½ ton vehicle destroyed during the battle. Enemy losses amounted to 76 KIA, 19 of which were directly credited to the four Duster crews. Automatic weapons were directly responsible for stemming the initial enemy thrusts and inflicting heavy casualties and damage to the hostile force.

(b) 27 December 1968, M42A1 close defensive fires in support of infantry operations -- At 2220H on 27 December 1968, elements of the D/2/16 Infantry occupying an ambush position near Phu Loi came into contact with an estimated VC company. The most responsive fire support means available were two (2) M42A1's at a Night Defensive Position approximately 1500 meters from the infantry ambush position. A request for M42A1 40mm close defensive fires was called in to the artillery LNO at the Night Defensive Position, and the CO of D/2/16 adjusted the fires on the enemy positions which were within 100 meters of the friendly troop location. The accuracy and volume of 40mm fire caused the enemy to break contact and withdraw. Although the M42A1 is not ideally suited to provide close support indirect fires to maneuver elements, this engagement clearly illustrates that the M42A1 has the capability and can respond effectively to emergency request for close support.

(c) 28 December 1968, Can Giuoc rocket attack -- At 280430H December 1968, one 107mm rocket was fired into the FSPB near Can Giuoc. The alert crew of track #212, C Battery, 5th Battalion (AW)(SP) 2d Artillery, observed the rocket in launch and flight. The crew then immediately delivered 60 rounds of 40mm on the target. No additional rockets were fired. At first light, the supported infantry unit swept the area and found eleven (11) additional rockets in firing position aimed at the Can Giuoc FSPB, one VC body, and blood trails leading into the tree line. The 9th Division credited the alert M42 crew with thwarting an enemy rocket attack and preventing casualties and damage to the Can Giuoc FSPB. This successful use of automatic weapons in the counter rocket role clearly indicates the desirability for rules of engagement which allow the automatic weapons freedom to respond immediately to tactical emergencies.

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(d) 11 January 1969, ambush vicinity Thunder III -- At 1015H on 11 January 1969, a dug in NVA company ambushed a mine sweeping convoy consisting of seven APC's of the 11th ACR and one Vulcan XM-163. The initial volley of enemy RPG fire destroyed the APC's immediately to the front and rear of the Vulcan, killing two US and wounding many others. The Vulcan, which did not sustain any damage, began to rake the dug in enemy positions with accurate and continuous 20mm fire. As the tempo of the engagement increased in ferocity, two more APC's were disabled by enemy RPG fire, leaving only the Vulcan and the remaining APC's to prevent the enemy force from overrunning the convoy. The Vulcan had almost totally expended its basic load of 20mm and 7.62mm MG ammunition when the sister Vulcan track from PSPB Thunder III arrived at the ambush site to reinforce the convoy and to provide a resupply of 20mm ammunition. Both Vulcans continued the fire fight until the enemy force withdrew. The results of the ambush were 2 US KIA, 28 US WIA, and 41 NVA KIA, 20 of which were credited to the Vulcans.

(e) 14 January 1969, Dau Tieng ambush -- On 14 January 1969, two (2) M55 Quads, organic to D Battery, 71st Artillery, were assigned the mission of escorting a convoy from Cu Chi to Dau Tieng. At 1100H, the enemy staged an ambush on the second march unit of the convoy. Using automatic weapons and RPG fire the enemy stopped the convoy by disabling several vehicles. Once the convoy was halted, the Quad which accompanied the second march unit, laid down a base of fire so the remainder of the march unit could escape the ambush kill zone. While in the process of laying a base of fire, the Quad took automatic weapons and RPG fire which punctured all the tires and disabled the mount. In the meantime, the Quad from the first march unit had come back to assist the disabled Quad. While the battle was progressing, two (2) Dusters, belonging to B Battery, 5th Battalion (AW)(SP) 2d Artillery, and acting as Ready Reaction Force for that road, were called to assist the infantry in sweeping the area. The two (2) Dusters which joined the infantry were in constant contact with the enemy ambush force and had to call Dau Tieng for a resupply of ammunition. Two Dusters with ammunition resupply arrived and joined with the other Dusters and infantry in sweeping the area. After several engagements with groups of NVA, the enemy force was neutralized and the Dusters returned to Dau Tieng at approximately 1700H. The aftermath of the battle revealed the American Forces had sustained 7 KIA, 12 WIA, one APC and one 2 1/2 ton truck destroyed. In return the enemy lost 122 KIA, 24 of which were directly credited to the Quad and Duster crews.

(6) Efforts to improve the accuracy of M42A1 indirect fire: Since early December 1968, Headquarters, 5th Battalion (AW)(SP) 2d Artillery, has been experimenting with 40mm indirect fire in a effort to develop procedures and techniques that will insure increased accuracy and minimize the possibility of artillery incidents. Registrations of 40mm have been conducted on a daily basis using the AN/MPQ-4A counter mortar radar located at Duster Compound. The initial accuracies plotted by the radar showed constant range and drift errors which limited the effectiveness of 40mm indirect fire. Because no drift tables are available for the M42A1, the 5/2 Arty FDC used the radar registration data for a 30 day period to

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develop standard corrections for drift. The constant range errors (over-ages) were researched to be a function of muzzle velocity. The only available firing tables are constructed using a MV of 2800 FPS when in fact the actual MV ranges from 2870-2890 FPS according to ammo data cards. Applying corrections for drift and the actual MV, recent indirect fire missions from Duster Compound have been achieving accuracies of 20-40 meters in range and 3-5m in azimuth up to a range of 9,000 meters.

(7) RVN Automatic Weapons Commanders' Conference -- During the period 7-8 January 1969, the 5th Battalion (AW)(SP) 2d Artillery hosted the RVN Automatic Weapons Commanders' Conference. The conference proved to be highly productive and provided the commanders and their staffs the opportunity to exchange ideas and discuss mutual problem areas. Major areas addressed during the course of the conference included: methods and techniques to improve the effectiveness of AW indirect fire, maintenance programs and procedures, Combat Readiness Evaluation Programs, AW deployments and employments, and revisions to Tactical SOP's based on lessons learned during the past year. The Combat Readiness Evaluation Program, developed by the 5th Battalion (AW)(SP) 2d Artillery, was particularly well received by the representatives of the other battalions and will be incorporated in whole or part into their inspection programs.

c. Logistics/Maintenance:

(a) The severe maintenance problems generated by the temporary interruption of the M42A1 closed loop replacement program have persisted throughout the greater part of the reporting period. Only during the last three weeks of January did rebuilt systems begin to arrive in country through the closed loop replacement system. Nine (9) rebuilt M42A1's have been received to date, and eight (8) more rebuilt M42A1's are scheduled to arrive in mid February. The arrival of these seventeen (17) replacement vehicles will in part relieve the critical maintenance situation that has developed and will reduce the percentage of overmileage M42A1's from 30% to 20% by the end of February 1969. However, although the arrival of replacement M42A1's will provide some relief for the overmileage M42A1's, the relief will only be temporary unless some positive measures are developed in conjunction with supported units to reduce the employment of M42A1's in extensive mileage missions. The continuing employment of M42A1's in extended daily road marches and convoy escort produces excessive strain and wear on M42A1 automotive components which measurably increases the maintenance work load and places unusual demands on the repair parts supply system. Efforts initiated by this battalion to reduce mileage through divisional channels have met with some degree of success, but the mileage reductions achieved were partially offset by the fact that 30% of the M42A1's had far exceeded mileage turn-in criteria and a large percentage of the remaining vehicles are very near the overmileage point.

(b) The M42A1 repair parts problem was aggravated during the reporting period primarily due to the absence of retrograde M42A1's which have been a vital Red Ball source of critical repair parts. The retrograded M42A1 repair parts source of the 218th Classification and Collection Company was exhausted in mid November 1968, and only recently with the receipt of the

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rebuilt systems have retrograded M42A1's again become available as a source of critical repair parts. Additionally, during this reporting period the nature of repair parts demands changed significantly. Not only did the quantities of parts requested increase, but the types of repair parts requested were quite different from any previous experience. Many parts, for which there had been little or no past demand experience, were requested during this reporting period. Consequently, unit PLL's and Direct Support ASL's were not prepared to accommodate this sudden change and the supply system could not be sufficiently responsive to meet the demands generated in the field. The reasons for these unprecedented repair parts requests is directly related to the overmileage and overaged M42A1 fleet, in conjunction with the employment of M42A1's in recurring high mileage and rough terrain missions. Historically, this reporting period is perhaps the first time that so many overmileage and overaged M42A1's have been engaged in extensive mileage missions for such a long period of time.

(2) Improvement in Overall Battalion Maintenance Posture:

(a) This last reporting period saw a very decided upgrading of maintenance standards throughout the entire battalion. The aggressive maintenance programs initiated by the battalion have measurably improved overall material readiness and have been instrumental in achieving high ratings on all higher headquarters maintenance inspections. During the last three months, six out of seven batteries of the battalion received II Field Force Organizational Maintenance and Supply Inspections and all six batteries received "Satisfactory" ratings.

(b) In summary, the outlook in the maintenance area is much more favorable and promising than it has been in the past. The resumption of the M42-A1 closed loop replacement system, upgrading maintenance standards at all levels and improved PLL and ASL stocks based on better demand factors are all encouraging indications for continued improvement.

(3) The mileage summary for the reporting period is listed below:

<u>Headquarters Battery</u>	<u>1/2 ton</u>	<u>3/4 ton</u>	<u>2 1/2 ton</u>	<u>5 ton</u>	<u>M42A1</u>
October	8,500	3,650	6,100	370	-----
November	9,500	4,250	6,300	400	-----
December	<u>6,133</u>	<u>1,533</u>	<u>3,609</u>	<u>99</u>	-----
TOTAL:	24,133	9,433	16,009	869	

Battery A

October	6,104	901	4,573	485	12,728
November	5,879	516	4,330	1,452	7,396
December	<u>5,175</u>	<u>1,100</u>	<u>5,537</u>	<u>720</u>	<u>10,725</u>
TOTAL:	17,158	2,517	14,440	2,657	30,849

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<u>Battery B</u>	<u>1 ton</u>	<u>3/4 ton</u>	<u>2 1/2 ton</u>	<u>5 ton</u>	<u>M42A1</u>
October	3,091	1,272	2,905	810	4,025
November	3,096	1,094	982	762	4,991
December	2,665	<u>724</u>	2,421	<u>89</u>	<u>3,198</u>
TOTAL:	8,852	3,090	6,308	2,468	12,214

<u>Battery C</u>					
October	7,146	248	4,474	391	5,521
November	7,297	32	3,999	353	2,302
December	<u>6,424</u>	<u>248</u>	<u>2,676</u>	<u>545</u>	<u>2,205</u>
TOTAL:	20,867	528	11,149	1,289	10,028

<u>Battery D</u>					
October	6,305	3,799	8,185	268	2,583
November	7,645	2,782	7,606	291	965
December	<u>3,447</u>	<u>3,238</u>	<u>7,880</u>	<u>101</u>	<u>1,605</u>
TOTAL:	17,397	9,819	23,671	660	5,153

Battery D (MG) 71st ArtilleryTOTAL MILEAGE FOR ALL VEHICLES: 37,136Battery I (SLT) 29th ArtilleryTOTAL MILEAGE FOR ALL VEHICLES: 67,4212. (C) Section 2: Lessons Learned: Commanders Observation, Evaluation and Recommendationsa. Personnel: Untrained Officer Replacement Personnel

(1) OBSERVATION: During 2d Quarter, FY 69, the battalion received few Officer replacements with prior training or experience in Air Defense Artillery Automatic Weapons.

(2) EVALUATION: Because the battalion was receiving few Officer replacements who were graduates of the F18 Automatic Weapons Course at Ft Bliss, Texas, it became apparent that some positive measures would have to be established to identify these school trained Officers for assignment to AW battalion upon arrival in country. Headquarters, USARV, was alerted to the fact that F18 course graduates have received training specifically tailored for assignment to AW units in RVN, and that Headquarters was requested to closely scrutinize the records of incoming ADA Officers to identify those who were F18 qualified. This identification required extremely close examination of personnel records because the F18 course does not award the MOS 1174 (Automatic Weapons Unit Commander).

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(3) RECOMMENDATION: Officer graduates of the F18 Automatic Weapons Course of Ft Bliss, Texas should have MOS 1174 as a pencil entry on their records to facilitate assignment to AW units in RVN.

b. Operations: Drift Correction Tables for the M42A1

(1) OBSERVATION: When the M42A1 (40mm) is used to attack surface targets with indirect fire it has been determined that drift corrections must be applied to the firing data to achieve the desired accuracy.

(2) EVALUATION: During the past two months this battalion has been using the AN/MPQ-4A counter-mortar radar to determine the accuracy of M42A1 (40mm) indirect fire. The results of daily radar sightings over this period of time prove that the 40mm non-selfdestruct round will always impact to the right of the target, with the degree of error usually a logarithmic function of range. The constant azimuth error is a result of drift, which must be compensated for with standard corrections if the error is to be eliminated. Currently, there is no approved drift correction table available to units employing the M42A1 in RVN.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Appropriate agencies of the Air Defense Center, Ft Bliss, Texas, should take the necessary action to develop drift correction tables for the M42A1 and make them available to AW units in RVN.

c. Training: None

d. Intelligence: None

e. Logistics:

(1) Expanded Maintenance Capability for M42A1 AW Units:

(a) OBSERVATION: Automatic Weapons Battalion and Battery Maintenance Sections as currently authorized by TOE are inadequate to support the M42A1 when employed exclusively in the ground support role.

(b) EVALUATION: Current AW Battery and Battalion TOE's, which were developed to support relatively low mileage air defense mission requirements, are inadequate to support the maintenance requirements of the M42A1 when employed exclusively in Armor/Armored Cavalry type missions. Maintenance sections have insufficient personnel, tools, and test equipment to accommodate the M42A1 maintenance workload that is generated by the high mileage and rough terrain missions currently assigned to the M42A1's in RVN. The wide dispersion of the M42A1 elements and the heavy mobility requirements as opposed to the relatively fixed positions inherent in the FAW Air Defense mission, have created maintenance problems that were not considered in the original employment concept. Essentially, the AW units of this battalion are performing missions closely associated with those of a Medium Tank Battalion or Armored Cavalry unit and therefore tend to experience maintenance problems typical of these types of units.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: Future deployment plans for full-tracked PAW units to be employed in ground support missions should be preceded by a study of maintenance resources currently allocated to Armored units and AW TOE's should be modified accordingly.

(2) M55 Quad 50 Cal MG Azimuth Band:

(a) OBSERVATION: The locally fabricated azimuth band on the M55 Quad 50 Cal MG is not sufficiently accurate to guarantee effective indirect fire.

(b) EVALUATION: M55 Quad 50 Cal MG crews have often been required to deliver indirect fire on surface targets in RVN. The accuracy of the fires delivered is appreciably limited because the M55 mount does not come equipped with a precision azimuth measuring device. To provide an indirect fire capability, M55 crews are fabricating azimuth bands out of locally procured items which provide accuracies of only 25 mils. Additionally, these locally fabricated azimuth measuring devices do not stand up well under vibration and constant use and require frequent repair and/or reinstallation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the azimuth band for the M55 Quad 50 mount be precision manufactured with one mil increment markings and affixed to the M55 mount prior to shipment to RVN. Another acceptable solution would be to equip the M55 mount with an azimuth indicator similar to the one on the M42 Duster, and locate it under the control handles.

f. Organization: None

g. Other: None

Theodore H. Schmitt

THEODORE H SCHMIDT
LTC, ADA
Commanding

4 Incl-w/d, Hq, DA

~~1 - Battalion Organizational Structure~~

~~2 - Unit Deployment and Missions~~

~~3 - Automatic Weapons and Searchlight Positions~~

~~4 - Combat Readiness Evaluation Regulation and Evaluation Sheets~~

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
8 FEB 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Battalion (AW)(SP) 2d Artillery for
the Period Ending 31 January 1969, MCS CSFOR-65 (RI)(U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 11 FIELD FORCE VIETNAM, APO 96266

TO: Commanding General, 11 Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFEC-RE,
APO 96266

1. The quarterly report of the 5th Battalion (AW)(SP), 2d Artillery adequately reflects the operations and lessons learned during the reporting period.
2. Reference Section 2, para 2a, Untrained Officer Replacement Personnel. Concur.
3. Reference Section 2, para 2b, Drift Correction Tables for the M42A1. Concur.
4. Reference Section 2, para 2c(1), Expanded Maintenance Capability for M42A1 AW Units. The 5th Battalion (AW)(SP), 2d Artillery is currently preparing an ATOE requesting an immediate increase in maintenance resources for automatic weapons battalions currently deployed in RVN.
5. Reference Section 2, para 2c(2), M55 Quad 50 Cal MG Azimuth and. Concur.
6. Errors in the report have been corrected with pen and ink.



E.E. HUFFMAN JR.
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

AVFBC-RE-H (9 Feb 69) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Battalion (AW)(SP), 2d Artillery for
the Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266

13 MAR 1969

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375


Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Battalion (AW)(SP), 2d Artillery for the period ending 31 January 1969, as indorsed.

2. Reference para 2e (2). This headquarters has recommended to the unit that an equipment improvement report be submitted to correct the deficiencies noted.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



B.G. MACDONALD
1LT, AGC
Asst AG

AVHGC-DST (9 Feb 69) 3d Ind


SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Battalion (AW)(SP) 2d Artillery for
the Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 20 MAR 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned
for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1969 from Headquarters, 5th
Battalion (AW)(SP) 2d Artillery and concurs with the report and the
indorsements of intermediate headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy turn:
5th Bn 2d Arty
DA, HQ II FFV

GPOP-DT (9 Feb 69) 4th Ind (U)


**SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 5th Bn (AW)(SP) 2d Arty for
Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)**

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 28 MAR 1969

**TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310**

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



**F. E. HANCOCK
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General**

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